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ABSTRACT
Suppliers (including companies and individual prosumers)
may wish to protect their private information when selling
items they have in stock. A market is envisaged where pri-
vate information can be protected through the use of dif-
ferential privacy and option contracts, while privacy-aware
suppliers deliver their stock at a reduced price. In such a
marketplace a broker acts as intermediary between privacy-
aware suppliers and end customers, providing the extra items
possibly needed to fully meet the customers’ demand, while
end customers book the items they need through an option
contract. All stakeholders may benefit from such a market-
place. A formula is provided for the option price, and a
budget equation is set for the mechanism to be profitable
for the broker/producer.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—
Statistical databases; J.4 [Social and behavioral sciences]:
Economics
Keywords
Differential privacy, Option contracts, Supply chain
1. INTRODUCTION
When dealing with privacy in a marketplace, the accent
is often on customers’ privacy, who may not wish to divulge
many private details or even the items they are purchasing.
Platforms have been devised to enforce customers’ privacy
requirements over the complete lifecycle of private data [5].
A market for customers’ privacy is expected to emerge [9].
Instead, little attention has been paid to the wish of suppli-
ers to protect their private information. Typically a com-
pany may wish to select the level of information it provides
to its customers, but the widespread adoption of e-shops
divulges a lot of details about company’s operations, not
just to prospective customers but to everyone accessing the
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e-commerce platform, including competitors. In addition,
suppliers may now be not just companies but individuals
(prosumers) who wish to sell product they happen to own
[12].
However, companies may wish to keep their data (e.g.,
their level of stock for a given product) secret. At the same
time individuals acting as suppliers may wish not to be pro-
filed and keeping secret the products they happen to own.
The definition of a marketplace where suppliers can sell their
products while retaining privacy is then a relevant issue.
In this paper, we claim that such a marketplace may be set
up with benefits for all the stakeholders (a broker/producer,
privacy-aware suppliers, and end customers) through the use
of differential privacy mechanisms and option contracts sub-
scribed by end customers. We define such a marketplace by
identifying all the relevant cash flows. We provide a for-
mula for the price of the option contract and set the budget
equation for the broker for the mechanism to be profitable.
The paper is organized as follows. The market is described
in Section 2, while the option price is derived in Section 3 and
employed to set an overall budget equation for the broker in
Section 4.
2. MARKET DEFINITION
Let’s consider a database of suppliers where information
can be obtained about the availability of a set of items, but
suppliers are somewhat screened. Suppliers could be ven-
dors whose typical line of business does not include those
products or wish to get rid of some remainders, or individu-
als (prosumers) who happen to have those products in their
availability. For example, the database could contain the
number of items available for sale at each supplier, so that
the vertical sum across all suppliers included in the database
would tell us the overall number of items available. Such a
database, providing statistics about the entities included in
it, is called a statistical database [11]. However, in a sta-
tistical database releasing statistical information may com-
promise the privacy of individual contributors. But suppliers
may wish not to divulge those information; for example they
do not want competitors (who could access the database) to
know their level of stock, or, as individuals, they do not wish
to be profiled about the items they own. If suppliers wish
to be screened, a curator may sit between the users, posing
the query, and the database. The responses to these queries
may be modified by the curator in order to protect the pri-
vacy of the contributors [2], for example so as not to tell
us exactly either which supplier can provide us with those
items or how many items in the set are available. Instead of
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providing the exact number, the database provides us with
an obfuscated number, which is more or less close to the
exact figure. A mechanism to achieve differential privacy is
the use of noisy sums: the response to a counting query is
the sum of the true figure and some noise [3]. The use of a
statistical database plus the use of noisy sums may therefore
protect the private information of suppliers.
When end customers demand for a number of items, the
uncertainty surrounding the actual availability of those items
doesn’t allow to close deals. In the presence of such privacy
constraints, we postulate that a market can develop through
the introduction of a broker/producer and the use of option
contracts.
Let’s consider the case where end customers demand for
k∗ items. A broker commits to provide them with the num-
ber of items required. In fact, the broker may procure those
items either by producing them itself (at a unit production
cost cp) or by resorting to privacy-aware suppliers, whose
availability is known through the statistical database previ-
ously mentioned. As already said, privacy-aware suppliers
do not release full information about the availability of their
products, but release instead an obfuscated number kˆ, which
is generally different from the true number k of items that
they can provide (though the broker may obtain a refined
estimate of the true number through Bayesian analysis [7]).
The privacy enjoyed by privacy-aware suppliers is reflected
in the price cs they advertise. Prices set by privacy-aware
suppliers depend on the level of obfuscation (i.e. privacy
protection): the higher the level of obfuscation (embodied
by the variance of the added noise), the lower the price. As-
suming cs < cp, the broker has a real advantage to procure
as many items as it can through privacy-aware suppliers at
the reduced price cs, and transfer part of that benefit to end
customers by setting a lower end price. If the availability
of items is not enough to satisfy the demand (k < k∗), the
broker/producer produces the remaining items (but does not
enjoy the full benefit of the reduced price).
In order to exploit the offer by privacy-aware suppliers, the
broker submits a query to the statistical database containing
information about the availability of items and pays a fixed
amount cq and receives the noisy response kˆ. It commits
to buy all the k items available, though they may exceed
the actual demand k∗. When the actual number of available
items is disclosed (at delivery), it pays the privacy-aware
suppliers the overall amount csk. If the demand is fully
met (k > k∗) the broker does not have to produce any item;
otherwise, the broker has to produce k∗−k items at the unit
cost cp. The resulting supply chain is shown in Figure 1.
However, such a procedure is not free of risks for the bro-
ker/producer, which, on the one hand commits to provide its
customers with the required items, but on the other hand
is subject to the uncertainty determined by the unknown
availability of items delivered by privacy-aware suppliers,
with the risks deriving from the commitments to buy all the
items available and, if required, to produce the remaining
ones at a higher cost.
The broker/producer has therefore to hedge against such
risks. A way we suggest is to resort to option contracts,
which are described in the next section.
3. OPTION CONTRACTS
As seen in the previous section, the broker/producer un-
dergoes a risk when resorting to privacy-aware suppliers in
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Figure 1: Supply relationships
order to meet customers’ demand at a reduced cost, which it
transfers to end customers through a reduced price. It needs
however to hedge against such a risk. In this section we de-
scribe a mechanism, based on option contracts, by which it
can achieve such protection.
Since the stakeholders that ultimately benefit from resort-
ing to privacy-aware suppliers are end customers, the bro-
ker/producer may transfer some of that risk to them, asking
them to pay a price to get the right to buy the desired num-
ber of items at a predetermined lower price (i.e., a booking
fee). In the language of financial markets, this is a call op-
tion, since it endows the end customer with the right to buy
[4]. End customers are then required to subscribe a call op-
tion to be sure to get the right number of items the wish at
a reduced price.
A critical issue in option contract is setting the right price.
In the typical scenario, the amount to be paid for the option
contract is expected to depend on the current value of the
items for sale, the predetermined price to be paid if the
option is exercised, and the expected behaviour of the item’s
value in the period from the option contract underwriting
to the exercise time. A simple form of pricing is given by
the Black-Scholes formula [1], but a form tailored for the
context is to be derived here. In [8], the risk of having to
buy the items exceeding the demand has been analysed, and
the following pricing formula has been derived for the case
where Laplacian noise is added to form the noisy sum [10]:
popt = Ek
[
(k − k∗)+cs|kˆ
]
= cs
[
(kˆ − k∗)+ + 1
2λ
e−λ|kˆ−k
∗|
]
,
(1)
where λ is the shape parameter of the Laplace distribution:
the smaller λ, the greater the differential privacy. This ex-
pression considers just the risk transfer concerning the extra-
cost of buying the excess items provided by privacy-ware
suppliers and does not consider the end price paid by cus-
tomers. As can be seen in Equation (1), the price is basically
the cost of the actual number of excess items plus a term
that accounts for the introduction of noise in the database
response and vanishes as λ grows towards infinity (i.e., as
the level of privacy reduces) and the declared number of
available items gets farther from the demand. In Figure 2,
we can see how the option price moves for three different
values of λ and cs = 1. The difference with respect to the
cost of the actual number of excess items is significant just
when the number of declared items is close to the demand.
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Figure 2: Option price
We can consider that difference as the premium to be
paid to cover the uncertainty introduced to Laplacian noise.
After defining the premium
X = cs
[
Ek (k − k∗)+ − (k − k∗)+
]
(2)
we show it in Figure 3 for the same case reported in Fig-
ure 2. We see that the premium gets its maximum when the
number kˆ of declared items is exactly equal to the demand:
the impact of uncertainty, and the protection from risk, is
more expensive when the noisy response appears to exactly
fit the demand.
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Figure 3: Premium
4. BROKER’S BUDGET
The option price reported in Section 3 is just of the eco-
nomic components in the interaction between the broker,
the privacy-aware suppliers and the end customers. In or-
der to examine the profitability of the market mechanism
for the broker/producer, we must get an overall view. In
this section, we review all the cash flows concerning the bro-
ker/producer and write a budget equation.
The broker’s expenses are represented by:
• a fixed contribution cq for the query, depending on the
noise variance;
• a unit price cs for each item supplied by privacy-aware
suppliers
• an internal unit cost cp for each item it must produce
to meet the demand if the items delivered by privacy-
aware suppliers are not enough.
On the other hand, the revenues are:
• the option price popt, for letting its end customer the
opportunity to benefit from the lower priced items of-
fered by privacy-aware suppliers;
• the unit price ps for each item delivered to end cus-
tomers.
The overall profit B for the producer is then
B = popt + k
∗ · ps − cq − k · cs − (k∗ − k)+cp (3)
Among the items entering the budget equation, we have
already derived in Section 3 a preliminary expression for the
option price (which does not take into account the end price
ps). As to the query cost cq, for the time being we consider it
as a fixed quantity, though for linear queries arbitrage-free
pricing mechanisms have been proposed in [6]. Similarly,
though in the following we assume cs to be fixed, we expect
it to be a function of the level of differential privacy.
If the broker knew in advance the actual number of items
delivered by privacy-aware suppliers, it could set the end
price ps so as to strike a profit:
ps >
cq + k · cs + (k∗ − k)+cp − popt
k∗
(4)
Unfortunately that’s not the case, and Equation (4) contains
a stochastic component due to k.
If we look for a price capable of delivering a profit on the
average, and recalling Equation (1), the end price can be
computed as follows (where, for simplicity, we have omit-
ted the conditioning of all expected values on the declared
number kˆ)
ps >
cq + Ek[k] · cs + Ek[(k∗ − k)+]cp − popt
k∗
=
cq + kˆ · cs + Ek[(k∗ − k)+]cp − Ek
[
(k − k∗)+] cs
k∗
(5)
Again assuming a Laplace distribution for the added noise
as in the computation of the option price, we can obtain
Ek[(k∗ − k)+] =
(
k∗ − kˆ
)+
+
e−λ|kˆ−k
∗|
2λ
− e
−λkˆ
2
(
k∗ +
1
λ
)
(6)
Introducing this expression in Equation (5) and rearranging
terms, we obtain the final expression
ps >
cq + kˆ · cs + cp
(
k∗ − kˆ
)+
− cs
(
kˆ − k∗
)+
k∗
+
(cp − cs) e−λ|kˆ−k
∗|
2λ
− cp
2
e−λkˆ
(
k∗ + 1
λ
)
k∗
(7)
In order to obtain a practical mechanism to set the end
price, we expect to introduce the dependence of the query
price cq and the privacy-aware suppliers’ price cs on the level
of differential privacy.
5. BENEFITS
All the stakeholders are expected to benefit from the ex-
istence of such a market.
Privacy-aware suppliers are able to sell their products pro-
tecting their privacy at the same time. Though they are
expected to sell at a lower price, they can decide the obfus-
cation level (i.e. the level of protection of their privacy) and
establish the desired trade-off between privacy and profits.
On the other hand, the broker/producer can benefit from
its dual role. As a producer it may sell its products at the
current price but obtain an additional stream of revenue by
selling option rights. As a broker, it may exploit the option
mechanism and provide its end customers with the required
number of items while taking advantage of the reduced price
offered by privacy-aware suppliers. In a profitable context,
the broker is incentivized to be trustable and keep the secret
on the actual number of available items when it is disclosed
at delivery.
Finally, end customers are certain to obtain the number
of items they want, while taking advantage of privacy-aware
price reductions at the same time.
6. CONCLUSIONS
A marketplace has been envisaged where suppliers may
retain their private information (e.g., their identity, and the
type and quantity of items they stock). A broker acts be-
tween end customers and privacy-aware suppliers, employing
option contracts to guarantee the full delivery of items. A
formula has been provided for the option price, protecting
the broker against the risk of buying items in excess of those
demand by end customers. The option price is the cost of
the actual number of excess items plus a term that accounts
for the introduction of noise in the database response and
vanishes as the level of privacy reduces and the declared
number of available items gets farther from the true one.
The budget equation for the broker has also been set, and a
formula has been derived for the minimum price to get the
mechanism profitable for the broker on the average.
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